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COMES NOW the Plaintiff, by its attorney, Tony C. Baird, Deputy Cache County
Attorney, and tenders its Brief in this appeal pursuant to Rule 24 U.R.A.P. as follows:

JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a3(2)(d) and (f), (1953 as amended). Pursuant to Rule 4 U.R.A.P. the Court has transferred
this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
First Issue: Whether Trooper Kendrick had reasonable suspicion to detain the
Defendant.
Second Issue: Whether Trooper Kendrick lawfully opened the Defendant's car door
to make contact with the Defendant.
Third Issue: Whether the Defendant was properly arrested by Trooper Kendrick.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews the factual findings underlying a trial court's ruling on a motion
to suppress under a clearly erroneous standard; State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 657 (Utah
Ct. App. 1996); and reviews the trial court's conclusions based on the totality of those facts
for correctness. Id
A trial court's findings of fact in a criminal bench trial are reviewed under the clearly
erroneous standard. See State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 787 n.2 (Utah 1988). A trial
court's finding is clearly erroneous when it is against the clear weight of the evidence or,
1

although there is evidence to support it, the court reviewing all the record evidence is left
with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d
932, 935 (Utah 1994).
A trial court's conclusions of law in criminal cases are reviewed for correctness. State
v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935, 939 (Utah 1994); State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah
1993). The appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to
the trial court's determination of law. Pena, 869 P.2d at 936.

GOVERNING STATUTES
A copy of the following statute cited herein is included in the Addendum to this
Brief:
Utah Code Annotated. §41-6-44, (1953 as amended)

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1.

While parked on the shoulder of the highway during the course of a traffic stop,
Trooper Kendrick of the Utah Highway Patrol was approached by a concerned
citizen. (R. at 13). The citizen pulled up behind the trooper's patrol car in a blue
Dodge Caravan. He got out of his car, walked up to the Trooper and reported that he
had just observed another car driving all over the roadway, and that this car had
(either) struck (or) almost struck three vehicles. (R. at 32-33). The citizen identified
the car's license plate number, make, color and direction of travel. (R. at 32).

2

With this information, Trooper Kendrick ran the license plate number with dispatch
and obtained the registered address. (R. at 24, 35). He proceeded to this address and
2

while nearing the location observed the suspect vehicle, a pickup truck, pulling into
the driveway. (R. at 35-36). He exited his patrol car, now parked behind the pickup,
and approached on the driver's side.
3.

Trooper Kendrick knocked on the driver's side window to try and make contact with
the occupants, the Defendant and his significant other. (R. at 50). After a moment of
no response, Trooper Kendrick opened the door to speak with the Defendant, the
driver. (R. at 51).

Trooper Kendrick immediately noticed the odor of alcohol and

other signs of alcohol consumption on the Defendant. He also observed an open
twelve pack of beer inside the pickup. (R. at 56).
4.

The Defendant was invited out of the pickup. The passenger also exited the pickup
and began to confront Trooper Kendrick. Trooper Kendrick decided to call for
backup. He instructed the Defendant to remain and he would be right back. (R. at
60). After returning from calling for backup, Trooper Kendrick discovered that the
Defendant had left the scene and gone inside the house. (R. at 63).

5.

Momentarily, backup arrived, and Trooper Kendrick again initiated contact with the
Defendant by approaching the door to the living area of the residence inside the
garage. By speaking through the doorway, Trooper Kendrick told the Defendant he
could either come out of the house or he was going to come in to continue his
investigation. The Defendant then came out of the house on his own accord. (R. at
63-64).

6.

The Defendant consented to one field sobriety test. Afterwards, he refused any
further tests. He was arrested and subsequently convicted of driving under the
influence.
3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Trooper Kendrick proper.

v

and upon his own observations when he approached and subsequently arrested the defendant.
The approach and detention of the Defendant were ;;;n.: ;
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suspicion that the defendant had violated traffic laws and was driving while under the
influence. Further, Trooper Kendrick was justified in re-contacting the Defendant at his
hoi i le In ordei to :• :M ifii n le his investigation. The defendant's conviction should be upheld.

ARGUMENT
First Issue: Whether Trooper Kendrick had reasonable suspicion to detain the Defendant.
1 he Defendant argues i- ,*

•:•;•.- >• * .• ick lacked i easonable suspicioi 1 to detail 1

him. The State agrees that the Defendant was detained, that a level two stop occurred;
however, the State believes, and the record supports, that Trooper Kendrick had reasonable
suspicion sufficient to detain the Defendant for investigation.
"[Reasonable suspicion exists if the officer has a 'reasonable suspicion based on
(ihjPiin e hi'k ill fi ilit* iin\w>)tlif.il K im M|\ \ t\ in 1i iminal activity " In determining the
existence of reasonable suspicion, the court must look to the totality of the circumstances."
State v. Nguyen, S - information relied upon
(

I .Ji

:

r

-
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must suggest to the officer, in that officer's experience, that
. n;

i CI i _> v . v / i n u

p
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added).
With regard to \ chicle stops, the I Jtah Supreme Coi 11 i: has said: '[ \]s long as an
officer suspects that the 'driver is violating any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and
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equipment regulations,' the police may legally stop the vehicle." State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d
1132, (Utah 1994)(citations omitted). The investigating officer may rely upon his own
observations and/or other sources of information to form reasonable suspicion for a stop. In
cases where reasonable suspicion is primarily based upon a citizen informant's tip the stop is
proper if the information is (1) reliable, (2) provides sufficient detail of criminal activity and
(3) is confirmed by the investigating officer. See Kavsville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231
(Utah Ct. App. 1997). A tip from an identified citizen informant is extremely reliable. City
of St. George v. Carter, 325 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 17 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). The information
provided by the citizen informant should provide enough detail about criminal activity to
support reasonable suspicion (e.g. illegal activity observed, description of vehicle, license
number, and location of incident). Id To confirm a citizen informant's tip, the officer need
not actually observe the reported behavior; it is sufficient, for example, that he verifies the
suspect car's description and location within a reasonable time of the tip. Id
In the present case, (1) Trooper Kendrick relied upon the eye witness report of a
citizen informant, an extremely reliable source of information. The citizen appeared to be
motivated out of community concern, going out of his way to stop and contact Trooper
Kendrick while he was parked on the side of the highway.
(2) The citizen provided detailed information regarding the incident. One, he
described the Defendant's driving pattern, how the car was driving all over the roadway and
had (either) struck (or) almost struck three vehicles. Two, he provided a description of the
vehicle, including the type and make. Three, he provided the license plate number to the
Defendant's vehicle. And, four, he indicated the approximate location and direction of travel
of the vehicle.
5

(3) Trooper Kendrick also confirmed the citizen's information by locating the
;:

Defendar.i N w i n . . ; •

.•»**-

-1.4

into the Defendant's driveway.
Tii.• information supports a reasonable i-a.-,. L . ;H.

.

•» - ,-

1

committed or was in the process of committing a traffic offense (e.g., improper lane travel,
reckless driving or driving vv liile under the influence). Iherefore, 11ooper Kendrick had
sufficient fri; t. wherein he could conclude, and articulate, reasonable suspicion in order to
stop and/or detain the Defendant for further investigation. The Defendant was properly
appi oached and detaine d 1: 3 1 1 oopei Kendi ick

Second Issue: Whether Trooper Kendi

• J i:

:e* .-,•

to make contact with the Defendant.
The Defendant also argues that Trooper Kendrick performed an illegal search by
opening (IK: dinei " MI k 11 nil nl mini Defendnni' > [in kup hrsiimabl} , this \ \ 01 ild mean that
the Defendant's arrest was improper as it flowed from the fruit of the poisonous tree. The
SLile iclules Iliis.t• j.1 • 111 n.'i• 1 nn i\s m jnoiind 1

I "" 1 n'tc1 M id,

'm^ nhjt I mopei K.eii(lri(i \

actions were part of a legitimate investigative detention and need only be supported by
reasonable suspicion. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 I J S 1, 22-23 (1968)(polic e office 1 n iai,;; , ( • hen
supported by reasonable suspicion, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible
criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest); United States v.
Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 227 (1985)(if police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in
specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was or is 11lvolved in criminal
acti\ it> then a "I erry stop 1 naj be 1 iiacie to in v estigate that suspicion). As discussed above,
6

Trooper Kendrick
had sufficient facts wherein he could conclude, and articulate, reasonable suspicion in order
to approach and/or detain the Defendant for further investigation. With this, he approached
the Defendant's pickup, knocked on the window, waited, received no response, and then
opened the door with the sole purpose to contact the Defendant to investigate the citizen
informant's complaint. (R. at 50, lines 18 through 25.) Trooper Kendrick's actions,
therefore, were justified and should be upheld as part of a legitimate investigative detention.
Second, even if this Court finds that Trooper Kendrick's actions were a search and
not part of a legitimate investigative detention, this Court should still uphold the Defendant's
arrest and conviction, as any evidence that was obtained as a result of Trooper Kendrick
opening the door would have been ultimately or inevitably discovered by lawful means. See
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984) (inevitable discovery rule allows the admission of
evidence if the information ultimately and inevitably would have been discovered by lawful
means). As aforementioned, Trooper Kendrick had reasonable suspicion to detain the
Defendant for investigation. His intent was to speak with the Defendant about the complaint.
Inevitably, Trooper Kendrick would have made personal contact with the Defendant and
detected the odor of alcoholic beverage coming from his person and observed the other signs
of alcohol consumption on the Defendant. The Defendant was at his residence and preparing
to get out of the truck to enter the home — presumably, the Defendant was not going to spend
the night in the pickup and would have exited shortly. When the Defendant exited the
pickup, Trooper Kendrick would be there to make the same observations as when he opened
the door.
Under either of these grounds the State believes Trooper Kendrick's actions did not
7

taint the Defendant's arrest and believes this Court should uphold the same.
Third Issue: Whether I roopei Kendi ick proper 1} i e cent itacte> :l! till: le Defei idant at his h :»! i le
The Defendant next asserts that Trooper Kendrick conducted an unreasonable
warrantless search or seizure of the defendant;.. . M.UI;:. ., -: \rticie i, .sc^rn

..., i iai

State Constitution when he re-contacted the defendant at his home. Presumably, this would
mean that the Defendant's arrest was improper as it flowed from the fruit of the poisonous
tree

Mir I 11 'i' 111 111 \y i'n *'< i li 111»ii M i11'l Hi i il MII'II ii i • m u ' 11 is i u 11
Firstly, there never was an entry into the home; the officers merely approached the

home's LMitiaiiu' .il lliegdm^L *11111 ^ M L lu lIn: Detniiliiiif (In

ii I llii dmir ' ii.'iiilril flu

Defendant was told by Trooper Kendrick that he would enter the home if the Defendant did
not come out but, as the situation iic-ntrv.- -.=ut, neithe i I i oopei Kendi i ::k noi an> other officei
entered the home. The Defendant came out on his own accord and subjected himself to
further investigation by Trooper Kendrick. Therefore, there was not a warrantless entry into
the Defendant's home and the Defendant's arrest was proper.
Secondly, even if this Court finds that Trooper Kendrick entered the Defendant's
h

"*•'

jzarajjy >

'

. •..' ••=

• .iu:.: rh's Court should still

uphold the Defendant's arrest. The actions of the officer were fully justified. Trooper

"[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him to reasonably conclude

justified." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct 1868, 1884, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889 (1968). The
defendant disobeyed the officer's order to remain thereby creating the need foi the officei to
re-contact him. A suspect cannot openly thumb his nose at an investigating officer by
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disobeying his order, entering his home and then feigning constitutional protections. To
uphold such logic would frustrate legitimate law enforcement investigations and encourage
dangerous conduct by detainees. See, e.g., U.C.A. § 44-6-13.5("Failure to respond to
officer's signal to stop") and U.C.A. § 76-8-305 ("Interference with arresting officer").
Thirdly, the officer's entry was justified under the "exigent circumstances" exception
to the warrant requirement. An officer may enter a home without a warrant when he has
probable cause and an exigent circumstance exists. See State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 15-16
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). In the present case, Trooper Kendrick had probable cause to believe
that the Defendant had committed the offense of driving while under the influence. (1) He
had received reliable information from a citizen informant of the Defendant's driving pattern
~ swerving on the roadway and nearly striking three vehicles — and confirmed that indeed
the Defendant was driving the pickup. (2) In the Defendant's pickup, he observed an open
twelve pack of beer. (3) He also observed the strong odor of alcoholic beverage coming
from the pickup and the Defendant's person. (4) He noticed that the Defendant's speech was
slurred, face flaccid and ptosis of the eyes. (R. at 56-57). (5) The Defendant was somewhat
clumsy and dropped his wallet and other papers. (R. at 57). (6) The Defendant admitted to
drinking alcohol. (R. at 59). (7) The Defendant attempted to avoid any further questioning
or investigation by Trooper Kendrick. (R. at 60-65). And, (8) the Defendant appeared
unstable on his feet. (R. at 61).
Further, in the present case, an exigent circumstance existed. "Exigent circumstances
are those 'that would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry...was necessary to
prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence,
the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law
9

enforcement efforts.'" Beavers, 859 P.2d at 18.
This case satisfies several of the factual scenario of exigent circumstances proposed
by Beavers. 1) Preservation of Evidence: Alcohol dissipates from the body over time; it is
crucial to perform relevant tests shortly after the stop. 2) Escape of Suspect: The defendant
left the scene after being told by the officer to "stay put." 3) Frustration of Law Enforcement
Efforts: The defendant's departure from the scene after being ordered to stay violates U.C.A
§ 76-8-305, ("Interference with an arresting officer").
Therefore, because Trooper Kendrick entered the home under the exigent
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, the Defendant's arrest was proper.

CONCLUSION
Officer Kendrick properly acted on information he received by a citizen informant
and upon his own observations when he approached and subsequently arrested the defendant.
The approach and detention of the Defendant were firmly based on articulable reasonable
suspicion that the defendant had violated traffic laws and was driving while under the
influence. Further, Trooper Kendrick was justified in re-contacting the Defendant at his
home in order to continue his investigation. The defendant's conviction should be upheld.

DATED this _*>_ day of June, 1998.

Tony C. Baird
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Attorney for Appellant
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ADDENDUM

"A"

UT ST § 41-6-44, Driving under the influence of alcoh I, drugs, or with specified or unsafe blood
alcohol concentration-Measurement of blood or brea alcohol-Criminal punishment-Arrest
without warrant-Penalties-Suspension or revocation f license

Utah Code § 41-6-44

Page 1

section adopted in compliance with Section
41-6-43; and

WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 41. MOTOR VEHICLES
CHAPTER 6. TRAFFIC RULES AND
REGULATIONS
ARTICLE 5. DRIVING WHILE
INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS
DRIVING
Current through End of 1997 General and 1st and
2nd Sp. Sess.

§ 41-6-44. Driving under the influence of
alcohol, drugs, or with specified or unsafe
blood alcohol concentration—Measurement
of blood or breath alcohol—Criminal
punishment—Arrest
without
warrantPenalties—Suspension or revocation of
license

(c) the standard of negligence is that of simple
negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of
care that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent
person exercises under like or similar
circumstances.
(2)(a) A person may not operate or be in actual
physical control of a vehicle within this state if
the person:
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration
of.08 grams or greater as shown by a chemical
test given within two hours after the alleged
operation or physical control; or
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug,
or the combined influence of alcohol and any
drug to a degree that renders the person incapable
of safely operating a vehicle.

(1) As used in this section:
(a) "prior conviction" means any conviction for
a violation of:

(b) The fact that a person charged with violating
this section is or has been legally entitled to use
alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any
charge of violating this section.

(i) this section;
(ii) alcohol-related reckless
Subsections (9) and (10);

driving

under

(iii) local ordinances similar to this section or
alcohol-related reckless driving adopted in
compliance with Section 41-6-43;
(iv) automobile
76-5-207; or

homicide

under

Section

(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be
based upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of
blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath
shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 210
liters of breath.
*11516 (3) A person convicted the first or
second time of a violation of Subsection (2) is
guilty of a:
(a) class B misdemeanor; or

(v) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other
state, the United States, or any district,
possession, or territory of the United States which
would constitute a violation of this section or
alcohol-related reckless driving if committed in
this state, including punishments administered
under 10 U.S.C. 815;
(b) a violation of this section includes a
violation under a local ordinance similar to this

(b) class A misdemeanor if the person:
(i) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another
as a proximate result of having operated the
vehicle in a negligent manner; or
(ii) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the
vehicle at the time of the offense.

Copyright (c) West Group 1997 r > claim to original U.S. Govt, works

UT ST § 41-6-44, Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or with specified or unsafe blood
alcohol concentration-Measurement of blood or breath alcohol-Criminal punishment-Arrest
without warrant-Penalties-Suspension or revocation of license

(4)(a) As part of any sentence imposed the court
shall, upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory
jail sentence of not less than 48 consecutive
hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part
of a jail sentence, require the person to work in a
community-service work program for not less
than 24 hours.
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or
community-service work program, the court shall:
(i) order the person to participate in an
assessment and educational series at a licensed
alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility,
as appropriate; and

Page 2

(d) The court may order the person to obtain
treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency
rehabilitation facility.
(6)(a) A third or subsequent conviction for a
violation committed within six years of two or
more prior convictions under this section is a:
(i) class A misdemeanor except as provided in
Subsection (ii); and
(ii) third degree felony if at least:
(A) three prior convictions are for violations
committed after April 23, 1990; or
*11517 (B) two prior convictions are for
violations committed after July 1, 1996.

(ii) impose a fine of not less than $700.
(d) For a violation committed after July 1, 1993,
the court may order the person to obtain treatment
at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation
facility if the licensed alcohol or drug dependency
rehabilitation facility determines that the person
has a problem condition involving alcohol or
drugs.
(5)(a) If a person is convicted under Subsection
(2) within six years of a prior conviction under
this section, the court shall as part of any sentence
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than
240 consecutive hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part
of a jail sentence, require the person to work in a
community-service work program for not less
than 80 hours.
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or
community-service work program, the court shall:
(i) order the person to participate in an
assessment and educational series at a licensed
alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility,
as appropriate; and
(ii) impose a fine of not less than $800.

(b)(i) Under Subsection (a)(i) the court shall as
part of any sentence impose a fine of not less than
$2,000 and impose a mandatory jail sentence of
not less than 720 hours.
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to all or part
of a jail sentence, require the person to work in a
community-service work program for not less
than 240 hours, but only if the court enters in
writing on the record the reason it finds the
defendant should not serve the jail sentence.
Enrollment in and completion of an alcohol or
drug dependency rehabilitation program approved
by the court may be a sentencing alternative to
incarceration or community service if the program
provides intensive care or inpatient treatment and
long-term closely supervised follow-through after
the treatment.
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or
community-service work program, the court shall
order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol
or drug dependency rehabilitation facility.
(c) Under Subsection (a)(ii) if the court suspends
the execution of a prison sentence and places the
defendant on probation the court shall impose:
(i) a fine of not less than $1,500;

Copyright (c) West Group 1997 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works

UT ST § 41-6-44, Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or with specified or unsafe blood
alcohol concentration-Measurement of blood or breath alcohol-Criminal punishment-Arrest
without warrant-Penalties-Suspension or revocation of license

(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less than
1,000 hours; and
(iii) an order requiring the person to obtain
treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency
rehabilitation program providing intensive care or
inpatient treatment and long-term closely
supervised follow-through after treatment.
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or drug dependency rehabilitation facility; obtain,
mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol or drug
dependency rehabilitation facility;
or do a
combination of those things, apply to a conviction
for a violation of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45
under Subsection (9).

(7)(a) The mandatory portion of any sentence
required under this section may not be suspended
and the convicted person is not eligible for parole
or probation until any sentence imposed under
this section has been served. Probation or parole
resulting from a conviction for a violation under
this section may not be terminated.

(ii) The court shall render the same order
regarding education or treatment at an alcohol or
drug dependency rehabilitation facility, or both,
in connection with a first, second, or subsequent
conviction under Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45
under Subsection (9), as the court would render in
connection with applying respectively, the first,
second, or subsequent conviction requirements of
Subsections (4), (5), and (6).

(b) The department may not reinstate any license
suspended or revoked as a result of the conviction
under this section, until the convicted person has
furnished evidence satisfactory to the department
that:

(b) Any alcohol or drug dependency
rehabilitation program and any community-based
or other education program provided for in this
section shall be approved by the Department of
Human Services.

(i) all required alcohol or drug dependency
assessment,
education,
treatment,
and
rehabilitation ordered for a violation committed
after July 1, 1993, have been completed;

(9)(a)(i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea
of guilty or no contest to a charge of a violation of
Section 41-6-45, of an ordinance enacted under
Section 41-6-43, or of 41-6-44.6 in satisfaction
of, or as a substitute for, an original charge of a
violation of this section, the prosecution shall
state for the record a factual basis for the plea,
including whether or not there had been
consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination
of both, by the defendant in connection with the
violation.

(ii) all fines and fees including fees for
restitution and rehabilitation costs assessed
against the person have been paid, if the
conviction is a second or subsequent conviction
for a violation committed within six years of a
prior violation; and
*11518 (iii) the person does not use drugs in any
abusive or illegal manner as certified by a
licensed
alcohol
or
drug
dependency
rehabilitation facility, if the conviction is for a
third or subsequent conviction for a violation
committed within six years of two prior violations
committed after July 1, 1993.
(8)(a)(i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5),
and (6) that require a sentencing court to order a
convicted person to: participate in an assessment
and educational series at a licensed alcohol or
drug dependency rehabilitation facility; obtain, in
the discretion of the court, treatment at an alcohol

(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts
that shows whether there was consumption of
alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the
defendant, in connection with the violation.
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before
accepting the plea offered under this subsection of
the consequences of a violation of Section
41-6-44.6 or of 41-6-45.
(c) The court shall notify the department of each
conviction of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45
entered under this subsection.
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(10) A peace officer may, without a warrant,
arrest a person for a violation of this section when
the officer has probable cause to believe the
violation has occurred, although not in his
presence, and if the officer has probable cause to
believe that the violation was committed by the
person.
*11519 (1 l)(a) The Department of Public Safety
shall:
(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a
person convicted for the first time under
Subsection (2);
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person
convicted of any subsequent offense under
Subsection (2) if the violation is committed
within a period of six years from the date of the
prior violation; and
(iii) suspend or revoke the license of a person as
ordered by the court under Subsection (12).
(b) The department shall subtract from any
suspension or revocation period the number of
days for which a license was previously
suspended under Section 53-3-223, if the previous
suspension was based on the same occurrence
upon which the record of conviction is based.
(12)(a) In addition to any other penalties
provided in this section, a court may order the
operator's license of a person who is convicted of
a violation of Subsection (2) to be suspended or
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revoked for an additional period of 90 days, 180
days, or one year to remove from the highways
those persons who have shown they are safety
hazards.
(b) If the court suspends or revokes the person's
license under this subsection, the court shall
prepare and send to the Driver License Division
of the Department of Public Safety an order to
suspend or revoke that person's driving privileges
for a specified period of time.
Amended by Laws 1994, c. 159; Laws 1994, c. 263; Laws
1996, c. 71, § 1, eff. July 1, 1996; Laws 1996, c. 220, § 1,
eff. July 1, 1996; Laws 1996, c. 223, § 2, eff. July 1, 1996;
Laws 1997, c. 68, § 1, eff May 5, 1997.
HISTORICAL NOTES
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Section 3 of Laws 1996, c. 220, provides:
"If this bill and S.B. 4 [Laws 1996, c. 71], DUI
Amendments, both pass, it is the intent of the Legislature
that the amendments in Subsection 41-6-44(6) in this bill
supersede the amendments to Subsections 41-6-44(6) and (7)
in S.B. 4."
Section 5(1) of Laws 1996, c. 223, provides:
"If this bill and H.B. 3 [Laws 1996, c. 220], Driving Under
the Influence Penalty Enhancement, both pass, it is the intent
of the Legislature that the amendments to Subsection
41-6-44(6) in H.B. 3 supersede the amendments to
Subsection 41-6-44(6)(a), (6)(b), and (7) in this bill."
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